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Recent evidence on the impact of fiscal policy  – taxes, public expenditures and budget 
deficits – on long-run growth in OECD countries has adopted the Barro (1990) framework 
to distinguish between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ expenditures, and ‘distortionary’ and 
‘non-distortionary’ taxes.  Using estimated long-run growth effects from these fiscal 
variables, this paper simulates the effects on growth rates of observed fiscal policy changes 
in the EU.  With two exceptions, the individual country growth effects of actual changes in 
taxes, expenditures and deficits appear plausible at around –0.2 to +0.2 of a percentage 
point per annum.  Few common policy scenarios are apparent in the data however, with key 
sources of differences between countries being the extent to which distortionary taxes or 
deficits were used to fund public spending increases and whether additional spending was 
focussed on ‘productive’ activities.  Our results confirm that the change in the overall share 
of taxes or spending in GDP, or the annual budget deficit, is not a good guide to whether the 
growth effects of fiscal policy are likely to be positive or negative.  The paper also considers 
whether our growth regression model, which imposes parameter homogeneity across 
countries, is justified.  The evidence suggests this is the case, with a high degree of uniformity 
across countries. 
 
Finally the paper considers whether there is any evidence of ‘fiscal convergence’ across the 
EU. That is, are growth-affecting fiscal variables becoming more similar over time across the 
EU?  Though data are limited, the answer to this question appears generally to be negative, 
with little evidence of unconditional convergence.  Countries’ tax or expenditure/GDP ratios 
do, however, generally revert towards their steady-state paths. 
 
______________________________ 
*  This paper was presented in the III Complutense International Seminar on European Economy, 
organised by the European Economy Group at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in Madrid, 13-14 
May, 2002.   1 
I.  Introduction 
 
How far are economic growth rates in the European Union (EU) affected by fiscal policy?
1  
Recent empirical evidence suggests that changes in the level and mix of taxation, public 
expenditure, or fiscal deficits may have relatively long-run effects on growth rates in OECD 
countries.  After a brief review of the relevant theory and empirical estimates in section II, 
this paper provides some simulations of possible fiscal-growth scenarios relevant to recent 
EU experience, in Section III.  Important driving forces behind recent European integration 
have been the convergence criteria for budget deficits within the Euro zone, and a wider 
drive towards tax harmonisation.  Together with some evidence for convergence in the 
growth rates in per capita income across European countries, this suggests that there may be 
forces within Europe encouraging both the convergence of key fiscal variables and their 
resulting growth impacts.  Section IV explores some preliminary data on this issue. 
 
II.  Growth Effects of Taxes, Expenditures and Deficits 
There are now numerous endogenous growth models incorporating fiscal variables and 
which are capable of yielding predictions of long-run or steady state growth effects arising 
from fiscal changes.
2  Most such models have focused on one side of the government budget 
or the other – usually the tax side.
3  Barro (1990) and Cashin (1995) analyse both taxes and 
expenditures simultaneously, though both models preclude deficit finance.  For present 
purposes, the Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) models provide a useful 
starting point.  They adopt the standard Ramsey framework in which the consumption path 
of a representative consumer is obtained by maximising an inter-temporal utility function over 
an infinite horizon.  There are n producers each producing output (y) according to the 
production function: 
 
a ag Ak   y 
  - 1 =   (1) 
                                                                 
1 We define fiscal policy here as the level and structure of taxes and public expenditures, and the extent 
of budget deficits. 
2 See Kneller et al (1999) for a review, and the bibliography at the end of this paper. 
3 Devarajan et al. (1996) is one of few studies to concentrate on the expenditure structure.   2 
where k represents private capital and g is a publicly provided input (per capita).  There are 
therefore constant returns to  total (public plus private) ‘capital’ inputs,  k+g.
4  The 
government also produces consumption (‘unproductive’) goods, gc, which enter consumers’ 
utility functions but have no effect on production. The government balances its budget in 
each period by raising a proportional tax on output at rate t and lump-sum taxes of L, giving 
the constraint: 
  n(g + gc) = n(l + ty)  (2) 
Of course, lump-sum (or non-distortionary) taxes do not affect the private sector’s incentive 
to invest in the input good, whereas the taxes on output do.  Thus, with an isoelastic inter-
temporal utility function, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show that the long-run growth rate 
in this model (g) can be expressed as 
  g  =  l(1-t)(1-a)A
1/(1-a)(g/y)
a/(1-a) - m  (3) 
where l and m are constants that reflect parameters in the utility function.  Alternatively, 
using (2), (3) can be re-written as: 
  g  =  l(1-t)(1-a)A
1/(1-a)(t - {
y
l   c g -
})
a/(1-a) - m  (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) show that the growth rate is decreasing in the rate of distortionary 
taxes (t) and increasing in government productive expenditure (g), but is unaffected by non-
distortionary taxes (L) or unproductive expenditure (C).
5 
 
The growth effects of the alternative combinations of taxes and expenditures in the Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin model are summarised in the four cells in the north-west corner of the 
matrix in Table A below.  In addition, though Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) exclude the 
possibility of deficit finance, the framework is readily extended to include fiscal deficits, and 
their predicted effects on  growth are also shown in Table A (and are discussed further 
below). 
 
                                                                 
4 Notice however that public inputs are specified as a flow (investment) rather than a stock of capital, 
though this can readily be changed without altering the spirit of the model’s outcomes. 
5 Thus, in (4) the growth effects of an increase in unproductive expenditures, gc, financed by lump-sum 
taxes, L, cancel. 
   3 
It is immediately obvious from the Table that the predicted effects of taxes or expenditures 
on growth rates depend on: (i) the type of tax or expenditure considered (and hence the 
tax/expenditure  mix); (ii) the total level of expenditures; and (iii) how this is financed 
(compensating tax or expenditure change).  This is reinforced when budget surpluses/deficits 
are included. 
 
Table A  Growth Effects of Taxes and Expenditures 
    Public Spending:  Deficits: 
Financed by:    Productive  Unproductive   
 
Taxes: 
Distortionary  positive/negative 
























As Table A shows, even where all government expenditure is productive, the use of 




For this framework to be useful empirically, it is important to be able to distinguish 
productive from unproductive expenditures and distortionary from non-distortionary taxes 
within public budgets in practice.  On spending, a typical ‘first approximation’ is to treat 
government consumption spending as ‘unproductive’ (i.e. it affects consumers’ welfare but 
not private production efficiency) and treat investment spending as ‘productive’.  The latter 
usually includes (some or all?) education and health spending because of their effects on 
human capital accumulation.  The growth effects of public expenditure on current transfers 
                                                                 
6 As  Bajo-Rubio (2000) shows, a similar ‘inverted-U’ relationship between the growth rate and 
government size is also consistent with an augmented Solow model (i.e. constant returns to total capital 
are not required).  However, in the Solow case this only applies to out-of-steady state behaviour.   4 
such as social security remains a debated issue.  If these merely affect welfare they can be 
treated analogously to other ‘unproductive’ expenditures.  However, transfers may affect 
savings rates, inequality, enforcement of property rights, etc. and could therefore be either 
growth enhancing or retarding depending on the empirical relevance of these potential 
growth mechanisms. 
 
On taxation, in the Barro (1990) model ‘distortionary’ taxes are those distorting the decision 
to invest – essentially capital and labour income taxes.  With no labour-leisure-education 
choices, consumption taxes are non-distorting.  However, as Mendoza et al. (1997) show, 
human capital investment can be affected by consumption taxes when labour supply is 
endogenous.  Clearly, in practice, almost all taxes are distortionary to some degree and the 
key issue in searching for long-run effects of various taxes is whether these distortions can 
be expected to be substantial or minor with respect to the main determinants of long-run 
growth, such as investment or technical progress. 
 
In extensions to the Barro-type model allowing budget deficits, whether these affect growth 
depends on whether Ricardian Equivalence (RE) is assumed to hold – that is, whether the 
private sector anticipates future taxes and adjusts its savings to compensate fully for changes 
in public sector savings.  Where RE does not hold, budget deficits are generally expected to 
be growth-retarding.  This can arise because total savings are reduced (if the private sector 
does not fully adjust its savings or government borrowing finances consumption goods 
provision), hence reducing factor accumulation.  Alternatively, as Tanzi and Zee (1997) 
argue, if deficits are perceived as unsustainable, then changes in tax/expenditure policy 
and/or monetary policy will be anticipated.  Either is likely to retard growth via effects on 
investment from increases in expected inflation or uncertainties associated with possible 
fiscal policy changes.  Even if monetary policy is designed to ‘neutralise’ the inflationary 
effects of a budget deficit, growth is still likely to be retarded by the associated increases in 
interest rates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
   5 
 
III.  Estimating Fiscal Policy Impacts on Growth in Europe 
 
Using the framework discussed in section II, Kneller et al (1999) and Bleaney et al. (BGK, 
2001) estimated the growth impacts of fiscal variables on long-run growth in OECD 
countries.  In this Section we apply the BGK (2001) results to EU-specific data.  Firstly, we 
consider the effect on average growth rates of the changes made to the fiscal budget in 
various European countries over the 1990s.
7 
 
The estimates made here rely on correctly identifying structural from cyclical changes to 
policy.  To try to compare similar points in the business cycle we use data from the end of 
the 1980’s and the latter part of the 1990s and average across 3-year periods to minimise 
any remaining business cycle effects.  To maintain consistency with BGK the work here is 
based on IMF data at the consolidated central government level.  Data limitations reduce the 
sample to 11 European countries.  To these we add the US - the small size of its public 
sector compared to European countries makes it a useful comparison.  The eleven European 
countries comprise nine members of the European Union (of which six are Euro-members), 
plus Norway and Switzerland.  The BGK (2001) estimates are based on a sample of 17 
OECD countries over 1970-94, using a dynamic fixed effects panel with annual data.  A 
long lag structure (8 years) was included to separate the short-run and long-run effects of 
policy.  The fiscal data were pre-classified to match the types of fiscal variable in Table A.  
These are given in Table B. 
 
As noted above, growth theory predicts that unproductive expenditure and non-
distortionary taxes have no effect on growth and can therefore be removed from the 
regression equation.  Empirical testing contained in BGK (2001) supports this claim.  The 
estimated parameters of the remaining five fiscal variables (along with their standard errors) 
are listed in Table 1 below.  These results suggest that increasing tax revenues from 
distortionary taxes by 1 per cent of GDP reduces the average growth of the economy by   6 
0.411 percentage points, whereas increasing productive expenditures by the same amount 
increases growth by 0.387 percentage points.
8 
 
Table B  Classifying Taxes and Expenditures 
Productive Expenditure  Unproductive Expenditure  Other Expenditure  
Education  Social security & welfare  Other expenditures 
Health  Recreation   
Law & order  Economic services   
General public services     
Housing     
Transport & communication     
Distortionary Taxation  Non-distortionary Taxation  Other Revenues 




Social security taxes    Other tax revenues 
Payroll & manpower taxes    Non-tax revenues 
Note:  The budget surplus/deficit is calculated as total revenues less total expenditures. 
Table 1: Parameter Estimates from Bleaney et al. (2001) 
Fiscal variable  Parameter estimate 
(standard error) 
Budget surplus (surp/def)  0.105 
(0.06) 
Distortionary taxation (rdis)  -0.411 
(0.05) 
Productive expenditure (eprd)  0.387 
(0.07) 
Other expenditures (eoth)  0.040 
(0.07) 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7  To simulate tax, expenditure and deficit changes simultaneously and at a reasonable level of detail 
from the available literature we are limited to using the results in Kneller, et al. (1999) and BGK (2000).  
We consider the latter to be more reliable. 
8 Note that the estimated effect of the budget surplus on long-run growth is somewhat smaller (at 0.105) 
and, by assumption this figure applies regardless of the method of financing budget deficits (e.g. money 
creation, bond sales).  It might be expected that money-financed deficits would have especially harmful 
effects on growth (though not necessarily over the long-run).  However, macroeconomic policy in 
OECD countries in the 1990s has generally avoided significant money-financing of budget deficits. Note 
also that omitting ‘neutral’ categories (non-distortionary taxes, unproductive expenditures) from Table 1 
implies that these do not affect long-run growth but they may still affect the long-run level of GDP per 
capita.   7 
Other revenues (roth)  0.040 
(0.07) 
 
EU Fiscal Policy in the 1990s 
Table 2 provides some evidence on taxes and expenditures across the sample countries.  
During the period 1995-97 the government that appropriated on average the greatest 
proportion of GDP was the Netherlands, although several of the other European countries 
were not far behind.  According to Table 2 the public sector, measured by central 
government total expenditure, was greater than 40% of GDP on average during the period 
1995-97 in Austria, Denmark, France, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the US has the smallest government sector of the countries 
considered here. 
 
The greater portion of tax revenues in the sample are collected from distortionary taxes: an 
average of 20.7% of GDP against an average for non-distortionary taxes of 9.4%.  This 
varies between over 30% of GDP in the Netherlands to 13% in Finland.  Norway collects 
the greatest proportion of its GDP from non-distortionary taxes (15.4%), and the US the 
least (0.7%).  The figure for the US is low relative to the other countries in the sample partly 
because most indirect taxes are issued at the local rather than the national level. 
 
Unlike the revenue side of the budget, expenditures are more evenly split between 
productive and unproductive forms.  The average for all 12 countries is 13.2% for 
productive expenditure and 18% for unproductive expenditure.  The most generous welfare 
systems are in the Scandinavian and Western European democracies such as Sweden and 
France.  The least generous are in Spain and the US, again in line with expectations.  The 
greatest provision of productive expenditure is made in the Netherlands while the lowest is 
again in Spain. 
 
According to Table 2 all of the countries in the sample, except Norway, had on average a 
budget deficit during the mid-to-late 1990s.  Given the timing of the data used to calculate   8 
Table 2 it is perhaps unsurprising that the annual deficit in the EU countries is around the 
EMU-convergence limit of 3% of GDP. 
 
In order to estimate how changes made to fiscal policy over the 1990’s affected the average 
growth rate of the European economies we must separate structural from cyclical changes to 
fiscal policy.  Table 3 does this for each of the fiscal categories by subtracting the average 
for 1987-89 from the 1995-97 average.  The period 1987-89 was chosen as it represents a 
broadly similar point in the business cycle and the data were also averaged across 3-year 
periods to minimise any remaining business cycle influences.
9 
 
Table 2: Government Budget Data (% GDP), average for 1995-97 








enprd  surp/ 
def 
texp  trev 
Austria  24.2  8.9  17.9  3.8  5.5  19.2  -3.9  41.0  37.1 
Denmark  18.0  15.5  12.0  4.0  0.4  20.7  -2.1  42.3  40.4 
Finland  13.7  13.7  12.4  3.9  1.2  21.2  -6.1  38.4  33.2 
France  25.9  10.8  17.9  3.1  7.9  21.1  -3.6  44.4  40.7 
Germany  19.9  7.1  10.3  0.2  6.2  18.1  -1.7  33.7  32.1 
Netherlands  30.2  10.1  20.4  4.9  6.8  18.8  -2.8  46.9  43.9 
Norway  17.4  15.4  11.6  2.6  1.6  17.3  1.0  37.1  42.2 
Spain  21.0  7.2  7.9  1.5  2.1  15.7  -6.2  36.7  30.5 
Sweden  22.3  11.8  11.7  2.3  0.1  25.7  -5.3  44.8  40.2 
Switzerland  16.2  5.5  10.7  0.7  5.4  15.0  -1.1  27.4  26.5 
UK  21.7  11.5  14.2  1.6  5.7  16.3  -3.7  40.0  35.9 
US  18.2  0.7  11.7  0.4  4.4  7.1  -1.3  22.1  20.8 
average  20.7  9.8  13.2  2.4  3.9  18.0  -3.1  37.9  35.3 
s.d.  4.6  4.3  3.7  1.6  2.7  4.5  2.2  7.3  6.9 
Note:   All figures are expressed as ratios of GDP.  The ‘other revenues’ and ‘other expenditure’ 
categories are omitted from the Table to conserve space. 
rdis = distortionary tax revenues;  rndis =  non-distortionary tax  revenues; eprd = productive 
expenditure;  enprd = unproductive expenditure;  educ = education expenditure;  ehlth = health 
expenditure; surp/def budget surplus/deficit; texp = total expenditure; trev = total revenues. 
 
                                                                 
9 These calculated changes to policy are amended slightly to ensure adding-up across the budget 
constraint.  An identical data span was not available for all countries and so we compare the periods 
1989-91 and 1993-95 for Denmark, and  the latest suitable data for France, Germany and Switzerland is 
1991-93.  The estimated changes to fiscal policy in these countries are therefore more likely to contain 
information about cyclical adjustments.   9 
Table 2 also makes clear that the mix of fiscal revenues and expenditures differs markedly 
between countries, while Table 3 shows that no single factor dominated changes in the fiscal 
budget over the 1990’s.  Of the few likely common influences the political pressure to meet 
the convergence criteria for EMU entry is an obvious one.  This shows up only weakly in the 
data however.  The annual deficit fell as a percentage of GDP in Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands, while it rose in France, Finland and Spain.  In these latter countries the deficit 
was lower in 1997 than in 1995 suggesting that the process of restructuring was not 
complete in the data available here.  Of the three EU countries in the sample that chose not 
to join EMU, the UK, Sweden and Denmark, all saw a rise in the annual deficit as a 
percentage of GDP compared to the late 1980’s.  It would seem that any political pressure 
was less of a binding constraint in these countries. 
 
Table 3: Changes to the Government Budget 
               (% GDP; 1987-9 to 1995-7) 
  rdis  rndis  eprd  enprd  surp/ def 
Austria  2.6  -0.2  2.0  -0.8  0.8 
Denmark  0.3  -0.6  0.9  3.1  -3.0 
Finland  0.6  -0.2  -1.7  6.9  -6.6 
France  0.4  -1.0  1.4  0.0  -1.8 
Germany  0.7  -0.4  -0.4  1.5  0.5 
Netherlands  -3.0  -0.6  -3.0  -4.0  1.8 
Norway  0.0  -0.5  0.0  -1.3  2.0 
Spain  0.1  0.5  -4.1  1.0  -2.9 
Sweden  -2.5  0.0  -0.3  3.0  -6.3 
Switzerland  1.2  0.8  0.0  2.2  0.6 
UK  0.3  1.1  0.6  2.0  -4.0 
US  1.0  0.1  -0.1  -0.5  1.6 
rdis = distortionary tax revenues;  rndis =  non-distortionary tax revenues; eprd = productive 
expenditure;  enprd = unproductive expenditure;  educ = education expenditure;  ehlth = health 
expenditure; surp/def budget surplus/deficit. 
 
Despite the rather complex set of changes to the fiscal budget described in Table 3 the 
public sector (measured by total expenditure) increased by more than 1 percentage point of 
GDP in only four of the twelve countries: Sweden (1.9), the UK (2), Finland (3.4) and 
Spain (6.2).  It fell in Denmark (-0.7), Norway (-0.9) and the US (-0.2), although none by 
more than 1 per cent of GDP.  Given the decline in the deficit noted above it would appear   10 
from this that most European countries chose to reduce the deficit by increasing revenues 
rather than decreasing expenditures. 
 
In some cases expenditures on productive or unproductive goods and services were 
increased, perhaps to offset any negative political consequences of raising taxes.  In 
Germany tax revenues were increased along with unproductive expenditures, while in 
Austria it was productive expenditures which were raised.  The Netherlands is something of 
an exception: expenditures and distortionary tax revenues both fell (though again this may 
reflect a tendency to use some policy changes to offset the negative political consequences 
of others).  The net effect of these changes was to increase the size of the public sector by 
0.4 percentage points in Austria, 0.7 percentage points in Germany and 0.1 percentage 
points in the Netherlands.  A similar lack of consistency in terms of policy rules appears to 
have occurred in the EMU-member countries in which the deficit rose.
10 
 
Fiscal-Growth Estimates for the 1990s. 
Table 4 demonstrates that the net effect on growth of the changes to the fiscal budget in 
EMU countries is generally quite small.  The exceptions to this are Spain and Finland, where 
the long-run growth rate of  the economy decreased by over one percentage point per 
annum.  As long-run effects, these figures are probably too large to be credible and serve to 
highlight several limitations in an application such as this using currently available empirical 
estimates and fiscal data which, for those countries, may not completely eliminate cyclical 
effects.  Perhaps the most important limitation in this regard is the possibility of heterogeneity 
in the effect of fiscal policy changes across countries because of differences in institutional 
characteristics, as noted in Section III.  Caution over the size of these estimated effects leads 
us to remove these countries from the sample from this point onwards.
11 
 
                                                                 
10 In France the increase in the deficit was matched by a decrease in revenues from non-distortionary 
taxation but expenditure on productive goods and services were increased.  In Finland the increased 
deficit appears to have largely been used to fund increases in unproductive expenditure, while in Spain 
there was a large increase in other expenditure and some decrease in productive expenditures. 
11 The results in Table 4 are robust to the use of alternative parameter estimates taken from BGK (2001) 
which take account of possible endogeneity bias. 
   11 
Among the EMU countries, the average growth rate is expected to have increased due to 
fiscal policy in France and the Netherlands, and decreased in Austria and Germany.  It is 
clear from Table 4 that whether fiscal effects on average growth rates are positive or 
negative depends both on whether fiscal deficits increase or decrease and on the mix of 
taxes and expenditure. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Growth Effects 




Austria  -1.06  0.77  0.09  -0.18 
(-0.3  -0.1) 
-0.31 
(-0.5  -0.1) 
Denmark  -0.14  0.35  -0.31  -0.11 
(-0.2 0.0) 
-0.18 
(-0.4  0.0) 
Finland  -0.25  -0.67  -0.69  -1.41 
(-1.3  -1.5) 
- 
France  -0.18  0.55  -0.18  0.19 
(0.1  0.3) 
0.10 
(-0.1  0.3) 
Germany  -0.31  -0.17  0.05  -0.36 
(-0.5  -0.3) 
-0.31 
(-0.5  -0.1) 
Netherlands  1.23  -1.16  0.19  0.23 
(0.1  0.3) 
0.38 
(0.2  0.6) 
Norway  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.22 
(0.1  0.3) 
0.39 
(0.2  0.6) 
Spain  -0.04  -1.58  -0.31  -1.69 
(-1.8  -1.6) 
- 
Sweden  1.04  -0.13  -0.66  0.20 
(0.1  0.3) 
-0.11 
(-0.3  0.1) 
Switzerland  -0.49  0.01  0.06  -0.38 
(-0.5  -0.3) 
-0.37 
(-0.6  -0.1) 
UK  -0.14  0.24  -0.42  -0.29 
(-0.4  -0.2) 
-0.33 
(-0.6  -0.1) 
US  -0.40  -0.05  0.17  -0.30 
(-0.4  -0.2) 
-0.28 
(-0.5  -0.1) 
Note: Overall growth effects include effects from other revenues and expenditures. 
rdis = distortionary tax revenues; eprd = productive expenditure; surp/def budget surplus/deficit. 
 
 
Using the variance-covariance matrix to create confidence intervals around these estimates 
suggests that there is a 95% probability that the net effect of the changes made to fiscal   12 
policy in the 1990s is positive in France and the Netherlands and negative in Germany and 
Austria. These growth effects are reasonably precisely estimated and, though rather modest, 
are composed of much larger effects from individual changes to policy (see Table 4).  For 
example, the dominant factor explaining the 0.2 percentage point per annum net increase in 
average growth in France is the increase in productive forms of expenditure (row 4, column 
2).  By itself this added over half a percentage point to the long-term growth rate.  In the 
Netherlands the net positive effect appears to arise almost entirely because of a reduction in 
the deficit, given that the large positive growth effect from decreasing distortionary taxes (1.2 
percentage points) was completely offset by the decrease in productive expenditures. 
 
The predicted decline in average growth rates in Germany in the table is a consequence of 
increased revenues from distortionary taxation (0.3 percentage points) and decreased 
expenditure on productive goods and services (0.2 percentage points).  Proposed EMU 
membership and the re-unification probably explain much of this combination of policy 
changes in Germany.  Finally, in Austria an increase in revenues from distortionary taxation 
again appear to offer much of the explanation for the net decline in growth (1.1 percentage 
points), although this effect was to some degree offset by the effect of increasing productive 
expenditure (0.8 percentage points). 
 
The remaining EU countries used their increased deficit to fund increased productive or 
unproductive expenditures, with some compensating or additional movement in tax 
revenues.  In Denmark, Sweden and the UK, unproductive expenditures rose 1% of GDP, 
but whereas no substantive changes were made in the remainder of the budget in Denmark, 
Sweden experienced declines in distortionary taxation and the UK saw increases in non-
distortionary tax revenues.  As already noted above, the use of deficit financing meant that 
public spending in the UK and Sweden grew by around 2 percentage points of GDP from 
the late 1980s, whereas in Denmark the public sector actually decreased.  The reduction in 
revenues from distortionary taxation is the principal explanation of the long-run growth 
increase in Sweden compared to Denmark and the UK.  This change alone added 1 
percentage point per annum to growth.  Again the confidence interval placed round these 
estimates suggest a 95 per cent chance that the net effect of the changes made to fiscal   13 
policy in the UK and Denmark had a negative effect on growth and a positive effect in 
Sweden. 
 
Disaggregated Expenditures  
By disaggregating expenditure categories, greater detail can be added to the government 
budget and to estimated fiscal-growth effects.  The final column of Table 4 reports growth 
effects using regressions that disaggregate productive expenditures into education, health and 
‘other productive’.  The alternative parameter estimates have some impact on the estimated 
growth effects.  Perhaps the most obvious change is that for Sweden where the net effect 
alters from +0.20 to –0.11 percentage points per annum. The principal explanation for this 
switch in sign is the negative growth effect from reducing expenditures on education over the 
1990s that was not fully captured using the aggregated data.  Unlike the forecasts for the 
other countries this new forecast is outside the 95 per cent confidence interval made using 
results from aggregated data. 
 
The confidence intervals using disaggregated expenditure data are larger, suggesting some 
cost to using this greater level of detail in the data.  Nevertheless, in only two of the ten 
forecasts does the confidence interval cross zero (Sweden, France), indicating that while we 
must be cautious about the precise magnitude of net growth effects, we can remain 
reasonably confident regarding whether the net effect of fiscal policy was positive or 
negative. 
 
Heterogeneous fiscal-growth effects 
In estimating individual country fiscal-growth effects, we have assumed so far that the 
homogeneous parameters estimated over all countries applies to each.  This sub-section 
addresses an alternative source of potential differences between countries: that these 
marginal effects differ across countries.  That is, do regression parameters differ across the 
sample such that, ceteris paribus, some EU countries experience stronger fiscal effects on 
growth than others? 
   14 
It is known that the results from a dynamic fixed effects (DFE) regression are likely to be 
biased if, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) suggest, the assumption of homogeneity of the short-
run parameter estimates across countries cannot be accepted.  They show that this may be a 
more serious problem than the bias generated by the inclusion of lagged dependent variables 
and can lead to inconsistent and misleading results even for large T and large N.  To 
overcome this bias they suggest the use of either the pooled mean group (PMG) or mean 
group (MG) estimators (Pesaran, et al., 1999).  A comparison of the results from these two 
has the additional advantage of allowing us to address formally the question of whether the 
long-run effect of fiscal policy on growth is identical across countries.
12  Acceptance of this 
restriction implies that the results from the PMG estimator are more efficient than those from 
the MG estimator (Pesaran, et al., 1999). 
 
The estimated regression for the MG model is of the following ARDL form, 





j it ij it i t i i it F g F g g e g g b f + D + D + - = D -
= =
- - - ￿ ￿ 1
0 1
0 1 1 1 , ) (   (5) 
 
where i indicates the country, t is time, g is the rate of growth, F is a matrix of fiscal 
variables, f, b  and  g are parameters to be estimated and e it a classical error term.  The test 
for the long run effect of fiscal policy is made on the parameter b1 (the long run fiscal policy 
parameter adjusted for lagged growth).  Consistent with the general-to-specific approach, 
the lag structure of the regression is chosen on the basis of the Schwarz information criteria.  
The long run effect of fiscal policy across countries is taken as the (unweighted) average of 
the estimates from the N individual country regressions.  The PMG model differs from these 
single country time series regressions by imposing homogeneity of the long-run parameters: 
f i and b1i become f and b1 respectively.  A Hausman test can be used to test the statistical 
plausibility of this restriction.
13 
 
                                                                 
12 The PMG estimator has the additional advantage over the alternative mean-group (MG) estimator in 
that it performs well even when, as is the case here, N is small (Hsiao et al., 1997). The MG estimator 
tends to be thought of as providing better information about the short-run and error correction 
coefficients of the PMG model (Pesaran et al., 1998). 
13 We are grateful to H. Pesaran for making available copies of the GAUSS programme which were used 
for the estimation of the PMG model.   15 
The disadvantage of the MG and PMG estimators is of course that unless the available time 
series is very long a degrees of freedom problem is soon reached.  For this reason we 
restrict the right-hand-side variables to include the investment rate and three fiscal variables: 
the surplus, distortionary taxation and productive expenditure. These are chosen in light of 
the results from BKG (2001) and it is worth remembering that the coefficients on these 
terms must be interpreted as conditional, on those excluded fiscal variables, some of which 
the results from BGK suggest may be significant.  We are also forced to restrict the 
regression equation to include a maximum of two lags of the dependent variable. 
 
We begin by estimating equation (5) for the 16 OECD countries and then for the 10 EU 
countries.  As reported in Table 5, we provide the individual test statistics (p-values) from 
the Hausman test of homogeneity of the long-run parameters as well as the test statistic from 
a joint test.  For the OECD16 we find we can accept homogeneity both collectively and 
individually, although for distortionary taxation ( rdis) acceptance is at the 13 per cent. 
Similarly for the EU10 we can again accept the restriction that the long-run parameters are 
identical, although for productive expenditures (eprd) acceptance is at the 11 per cent level. 
Having accepted homogeneity of the long-run parameters we choose to report the results 
from the PMG estimator in the table. (We omit the short-run parameters to conserve 
space). 
 
Concentrating on the fiscal parameters, consistent with the results from BGK (2001) the 
surplus/deficit and productive expenditures are found to affect the growth rate positively 
whereas distortionary taxation is found to lower growth.  All of these long-run parameter 
estimates are significant at standard confidence levels.  The parameter estimates are broadly 
in line with those from BGK, the effect of distortionary taxation and the surplus are very 
close to the estimates found in that paper whereas the effect of productive expenditure is 
slightly lower.  In order to test whether this is because of the use of a different set of 
countries, a slightly longer time period and the removal of several variables from the right 
hand side of the regression we re-estimate the DFE model of BGK with these restrictions.  
Regression 3 (Table 5) imposes the same length of lag structure as BGK.  The DFE 
regression with a long lag structure in fact produces similar results to the PMG regressions.    16 
The coefficients are similar in value, although the standard errors are somewhat larger such 
that the coefficient on the budget surplus is no longer significant and that on productive 
expenditure is significant only at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001) argue that in small country samples the estimated parameters 
may be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of any one country, even when the Hausman 
tests do not reject the assumption of homogeneity of the long-run parameters.  Following 
their example, we re-estimate the PMG regression 1 excluding in turn one country from the 
sample.  Figure 1 reports the coefficients for each of the fiscal variables when a single 
country is omitted.  We also indicate the standard errors from the full sample results to 
provide 95% confidence intervals for the results. As can be seen the parameter estimates 
remain stable from such a test and never stray outside of the confidence bands.  The 
parameter estimates from the EU10 sample in Table 5 also lie within these confidence 
bands. 
 





































































  2.94 
(0.57) 
  5.39 
(0.25) 
 
Note: t-statistics in regression parentheses; p-values for Hausman tests. 
 
 
IV  Convergence and Divergence in EU Fiscal Policy 
The above results appear to suggest that fiscal policy has had a significant, and fairly robust, 
effect on long-run growth in European countries, and more widely in the OECD.  Evidence   17 
from, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and de la Fuente (1998) also suggests a 
tendency towards per capita income convergence within and between European countries.  
This raises the obvious question: has fiscal policy contributed towards, or acted against, 
income convergence in Europe?  There are, of course, several forces acting towards 
convergence of particular fiscal variables across the EU.  For example, the ‘convergence 
criteria’ for monetary union include restrictions on budgetary deficits for participating 
countries, while tax harmonisation guidelines have operated more widely within the EU for 
some time, encouraging moves towards similar indirect tax rates in particular.  Convergence 
of deficits and taxes would, of course, via the government budget constraint, imply some 
convergence of public expenditures.  However, as we have seen, within tax and expenditure 
totals, EU countries continue to have considerable discretion over distortionary/non-
distortionary and productive/unproductive components.  Since it is these components which 
are important for growth, growth convergence need not necessarily be fostered by fiscal 
changes. 
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We begin by considering whether the five fiscal/GDP ratios (2 x tax; 2 x expenditure; budget 
surplus) are converging over time for a sample of EU countries.  When examining income 
convergence, the usual measure adopted is s-convergence – measuring changes in the   18 
standard deviation of income levels.  In our case however, since we wish to be able to 
compare across fiscal categories as well as over time, standard deviations are not very 
helpful due to the absence of any normalisation.  An alternative, used by Sanz and 
Velazquez (2001), is to construct ‘similarity indices’ which measure the share of particular 
expenditure categories in total expenditure for country  i relative to the average for all 
countries in the sample.  A similar measure could be used for our GDP ratios. However, 
while this measure has a lower bound of zero (identical values across countries), it has no 
upper bound. 
 
For present purposes, Gini coefficients provide a preferable alternative.  Applied to the 
relevant fiscal category, these provide a measure of the degree of inequality (dissimilarity) in 
fiscal variables across countries.  Since our public expenditure or tax/GDP ratios are simply 
expenditures (or tax revenues) measured in GDP units, we can consider the spatial 
distribution of expenditures (taxes) across EU countries analogously to the distribution of 
income across individuals.
14  Thus a Gini = 0 implies complete equality (identical values 
across countries), and Gini = 1 implies complete inequality (i.e. one country spends the EU 
total, all others spend zero).  Table 6 below shows Gini coefficients for total revenue and 
expenditure, while Figure 2 shows Ginis for the two expenditure (eprd, enprd) and tax 
(rdis,rndis) components. Since it is important that the sample is unchanged across periods, 
these are calculated for five 5 -year periods from 1970-1995, for a sample of 10 EU 
countries for which comparable data are available.
15  (Period averaging has been used to 




                                                                 
14 Note that the tax/GDP ratios approximate effective average tax rates, such that harmonisation 
particularly of indirect tax rates in the EU might be expected to encourage convergence of rndis. 
15 The countries are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, UK.  Data for France and the Netherlands are unavailable for some categories for 1970-4.  Test 
in Table 7 therefore use 1975-80 as the initial period. 
16 Constructing a  Gini for deficits requires non-negative values. Those shown have therefore been 
constructed by adjusting all deficits upwards equally such that the smallest deficit (Finland in 1990-5) 
equals 1.  Ginis are not invariant to this re-scaling so that while Ginis for surp/def can be compared 
across time, they cannot be compared with those for taxes/expenditures.   19 
Table 6 suggests a considerable degree of similarity across EU countries, and both total tax 
and expenditure ratios have become more similar (equal) since the mid-1970s.
17  It can be 
seen from Figure 2 that there is also some evidence of unconditional convergence (declining 
Gini) for the tax components and productive expenditures, but not for unproductive 
expenditures, where values are approximately constant throughout the period.  Deficits, on 





Table 6 Gini Coefficients for Total Tax Revenues and Expenditures 
 
  Total revenues  Total expenditures 
1970-5  0.105  0.109 
1975-80  0.113  0.106 
1980-85  0.114  0.107 
1985-90  0.095  0.094 
1990-95  0.084  0.070 
 
To examine the strength of these effects we test for statistically significant changes in Ginis, 
and also use two tests for convergence based on changes in variances.  These are the 
Variance Ratio (VR), and Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests proposed by Lichtenberg (1994) and 
Carree and Klomp (1995) respectively.  The VR test is a simple ratio of initial and final 
variances while the LR test also uses the covariance.  Table 7 presents the results of these 
tests, which indicate that for cases of potential convergence, the null hypothesis of no 
convergence cannot be rejected (with the possible exception of  rndis).  Note that the 
alternative hypothesis, H1, is of divergence for unproductive expenditure and surpluses, since 
for these cases, the final period variance (or Gini) exceeds initial period values.  The Ginis 
suggest significant divergence for the budget surplus/deficit. 
 
Though there is little statistical evidence of unconditional convergence across the EU sample 
as a whole, it may nevertheless be the case that (i) a subset of countries share a steady-
                                                                 
17 For the initial period calculations, limited data are available for France (1972-4) and the Netherlands 
(1973-4). 
18 We have also calculated equivalent coefficients of variation which reveal broadly similar patterns to 
those in Figures 2 and 3.   20 
state; and (ii) that countries converge (conditionally) to their own, or a shared, steady-state.  

















1 , ln ln   (6) 
where y is the relevant fiscal variable, the as and b are parameters and e is a classical error 
term. The parameter b captures convergence (b < 0) from short-run disequilibrium, towards 
the steady-state; a t captures common time-varying shocks, while a i captures country fixed 
effects, such that a i „ 0 implies country i does not share a steady-state with country N – the 
‘default’ country. 
 
Results from this exercise are shown in Table 8.  There is clear evidence of within-country 
b-convergence with, perhaps unsurprisingly, especially strong equilibrating tendencies for the 
budget surplus/deficit.
19  However, tests of the null that  ￿ = 0 i a  generally reject the 
hypothesis, suggesting that the steady-state values for the various fiscal ratios differ across 
our OECD sample countries (though for  rndis, H 0 is rejected only at the 10% level).  
Similar rejection is evident for the EU10 sample. 
 
 
Table 7 Variance Ratio and Likelihood Ratio Tests for 
Fiscal Components: 1970/5 – 1990/5 
Hypotheses: 





2 2-test  
Gini change 
H1: Con = convergence 
      Div = divergence 
F0.05 = 3.44  c
2
0.05 = 3.84 
c
2
0.1 = 2.71 
t0.05 = 2.10 
t0.1 = 1.73 
eprd  Con  1.12  0.05  -0.035 
(t = 1.43) 
enprd  Div 
(Con for Gini) 
1.87  0.79  -0.007 
(t = 0.28) 
rdis  Con  1.16  0.10  -0.027 
(t = 0.97) 
rndis  Con  1.24  0.18  -0.043 
(t = 1.84)
* 
surp/def  Div  2.39  1.44  0.139 
                                                                 
19 Since the work of Arellano and Bond (1991), dynamic fixed-effects models are however known to 
generate biased and/or inefficient coefficient estimates arising from the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable.  The magnitude of b  should therefore be interpreted with caution.   21 
(t = 2.78)
** 
Note: the null hypothesis is based on whether the ratio of final to initial variances (VR test) 
exceeds or falls short of unity (or the Gini falls or rises). *(**) = exceeds 10% (5%) critical value. 
 
 
Table 8 Testing for Conditional Convergence 
Technique:  2-way FE; 5-year averages          sample 
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(p-values) 



















This raises the question of whether a European sub-sample shares common steady-state 
values?  If, as is often suggested, EU countries share similar fiscal constraints and have been 
following harmonisation processes over this period, it might be expected that their long-run 
expenditures, taxes or surpluses (as shares of GDP) would be similar.  On the other hand, 
different characteristics across EU countries (such as different population age structures, 
differing expenditure preferences) may perpetuate differing fiscal values in the long-run. 
 
To examine this, we proceed as follows.  First, using pair-wise comparisons, we consider all 
pairs of countries for which the hypothesis, a k = a j (k „ j) can be accepted.  Following a 
similar procedure for groups of three, four etc countries sharing the same a, we identify the 
maximum number of countries belonging to such a group.  For the three fiscal variables that 
appear in our growth regressions, this leads to the classification of countries given in Table 9 
below.  The F-statistics at the foot of each column test the hypothesis that countries belong 
to the groups to which they have been allocated. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting case concerns the budget surplus, where 7 of the 10 EU 
countries appear to share the same steady-state values (fixed effects), with only Denmark, 
Germany and Luxembourg excluded (the first two of which share similar values).  For rdis   22 
and eprd, shared as are less common with, at most, a group of 4 (rdis) or two groups of 
three (eprd) evident.  For countries labelled “different a”, we can accept the hypothesis 
that their estimated fixed effects are significantly different from all other EU10 countries.  
That is, each country is estimated to converge on its own steady-state value of rdis, eprd or 
surp/def. 
 
Two points emerge from these results. Firstly, it is not surprising that some EU countries 
choose similar long-run ratios to GDP for their productive p ublic expenditures or 
distortionary taxes, whilst some choose quite different values.  Secondly, evidence of b-
convergence (but the general absence of s-convergence) suggests that observed conditional 
convergence primarily reflects the tendency for countries to revert to their long-term trend, 
rather than any tendency for countries to approach a common steady-state over the period. 
 
Since the data available here terminates in 1995, it may be that much of the pressure on EU 
governments towards similar tax/expenditure patterns post-dates the current evidence.  
Nevertheless, for the period we can study, the results in this section suggest three things.  (1) 
There is very little evidence for s-convergence - relevant fiscal variables are not, in general, 
becoming more similar across Europe.  (2) There is only limited evidence of EU countries 
sharing the same steady state values of the three growth-affecting fiscal variables – rdis, 
eprd, and surp/def.
20  (3) Evidence of b-convergence implies that country fiscal variables 
tend to revert toward their steady-state paths. 
 
 
Table 9  EU Country Groupings 
  rdis    eprd    surp/def 


























                                                                 
20 A similar picture emerges for the other two fiscal categories, enprd and rndis, with groups of at most 
three or four EU countries appearing to share common fixed effects. 


















  Different a i: 
Luxembourg 
 
F0.05(15, 48) = 2.06 
             (p= 0.030) 
  F0.05(15, 48) = 3.67 
         (p = 0.0004) 
  F0.05(15, 48) = 2.09 





V.  Conclusions 
Recent evidence on the impact of fiscal policy on long-run growth in OECD countries has 
adopted the Barro (1990) framework to distinguish between ‘productive’ and 
‘unproductive’ expenditures, and ‘distortionary’ and ‘non-distortionary’ taxes.  Using 
estimated long-run growth effects from these fiscal variables from BGK (2001), this paper 
simulated the effects on growth rates of observed fiscal policy changes in the EU.  With two 
exceptions (Finland and Spain  - where long-run data appear unreliable) the individual 
country growth effects of actual changes in taxes, expenditures and deficits are plausible at 
around –0.2 to +0.2 of a percentage point per annum.  Few common policy scenarios are 
apparent in the data however, with key sources of differences between countries being the 
extent to which distortionary taxes or deficits were used to fund public spending increases 
and whether additional spending was focussed on ‘productive’ activities.  The paper also 
considers whether our growth regression model, which imposes parameter homogeneity 
across countries, is justified.  The evidence suggests this is the case, with a high degree of 
uniformity across countries.  One implication of these results is that changes in the overall 
share of taxes or spending in GDP or the annual budget surplus/deficit are not good guides 
to whether the growth effects of fiscal policy are likely to be positive or negative. 
 
Finally the paper considered whether there is any evidence of ‘fiscal convergence’ across 
the EU.  That is, are growth-affecting fiscal variables becoming more similar over time for   24 
the EU?  T hough data are limited, the answer to this question generally appears to be 
negative, with little evidence of unconditional convergence but evidence of divergence for 
budget deficits.  Countries do however revert to their own steady-state paths, but some EU 
countries appear to have chosen different long-run values for key growth-affecting 
fiscal/GDP ratios from their EU (or OECD) neighbours.  However, as might be expected, 
budget deficits show a higher degree of long-run uniformity, with a few countries revealing 
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